

























Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Agricultural and Applied Economics 
in the Graduate College of the  










 Associate Professor Kathy Baylis, Advisor 
 Professor Alex Winter-Nelson 








According to a recent World Bank report (2018), unsafe food costs low and middle-income 
economies nearly USD $110 billion in lost productivity and health expenses each year. Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa face the highest losses from unsafe food in terms of food and nutritional security, human 
development, and international trade. In addition to frequent outbreaks of foodborne illnesses, another cause 
of unsafe food is through toxic contaminants like aflatoxins. Aflatoxins are a family of carcinogenic toxins 
found commonly in agricultural crops in warm and humid regions, and chronic exposure can result in liver 
cancer, lung cancer, growth retardation, immunosuppression among others. A warming climate and extreme 
weather events may worsen the situation by making conditions more conducive for the growth of aflatoxin-
producing fungi. Our estimates from India show heavy infestation of aflatoxin in grains with levels over 26 
times the permissible limit. These grains are then exported worldwide where they are either rejected at port 
resulting in huge losses for farmers or fall through the cracks and reach consumers in other countries. The 
cost of such rejected food shipment is enormous (about $10000 per lot in transportation, storage, and 
dockage fees; (Wu, Liu, & Bhatnagar, 2008), even if the lot can be returned to the country attempting to 
export the food. Inability to meet these important food safety standards lead to lower prices for smallholders 
and welfare losses for both farmers and consumers. 
If consumers are willing to pay enough for safe foods to cover the extra costs associated with their 
production and certification, a perfect market would be expected to provide food safety. However, imperfect 
information in the food value chain can lead to market failure. One problem could be that ‘safety’ might 
not be an easily observable attribute; consumers, millers and traders might not trust that the product they 
are being sold is ‘safe’. Further, not only does there need to be enough value placed on food safety by 
consumers, enough of that value must reach each participant in the supply chain so that they have an 
incentive to provide and certify food safety. This pass-through of food safety premiums may be reduced if 
market intermediaries have substantial market power. To tackle information inefficiencies, we provide 
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details about food safety and aflatoxin to end consumers and traders. We ask whether there is enough benefit 
in the supply chain to afford the costs to produce and ensure food safety by improving food safety 
production techniques and establishing a certifying system. We estimate willingness to pay for food safety 
of various actors along the supply chain to see if the potential consumer premium is reflected along the 
supply chain. 
This thesis evaluates the demand for government and third-party certification on aflatoxin in India. 
We first test rice, wheat and maize samples from small farmers for the presence of aflatoxins and find a 
high incidence of contamination. We find that approximately 45 percent of maize, 30 percent of wheat and 
12 percent of rice samples had aflatoxin levels higher than the permissible limit of 20 ppb. We estimate the 
impact of providing aflatoxin information to retail consumers, traders on their willingness to pay for 
certified aflatoxin-free grains in India. We study the entire value chain of the three major food grains in 
India to understand the gaps in demand and incentive structures for food safety. 
Study Design 
To understand the existing demand for aflatoxin-free grains, we survey consumers, traders and 
millers in urban, semi-urban and rural areas in India. We also collect samples from local farmers to test the 
levels of aflatoxin in grains. We find that none of the end consumers and supply chain intermediaries at the 
baseline are aware of the negative health effects of aflatoxin in food grains. After providing them 
information on the detrimental health effects of consuming aflatoxin contaminated grains, we ask them to 
participate in a discrete choice experiment. We then measure the consumers’ and intermediaries’ demand 
for different levels of aflatoxin in rice, wheat and maize, along with preferences for the type of food quality 
certification agencies. To test for hypothetical bias in the stated choice experiment and ensure incentive 
compatibility in the elicitation mechanism, we also conduct a real choice experiment using binding-sale 
scenarios with retail consumers in both rural and urban areas. We also measure the demand for food safety 
from the middle stream stakeholders, the small traders in Bihar. We conduct a choice experiment to elicit 
the demand for different aflatoxin levels for grains and the demand for hermetic bag storage. As discussed 
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by McFadden, Tye, & Train (1977), the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property implies that 
the variables that are omitted from the model are independent random variables. This might not be true in 
our case; hence we use a mixed logit model for analysis since it does not require the IIA property and 
captures preference heterogeneity, being more appropriate for estimating the Willingness to Pay in this 
study. We conduct a choice-benefit analysis for the farmers to estimate the benefits of securing a 
certification label. We calculate our cost estimates from an existing organic certification agency in India 
and the benefits are calculated from the stated consumer demand in the choice experiment.  
Results 
Results from our mixed logit model suggests that consumers are willing to pay a large premium for 
safe levels of aflatoxin in food grains. For aflatoxin levels below 20 ppb, retail consumers are willing to 
pay nearly 30 percent more than the current market price for food grains. As compared to the participants 
of discrete choice experiment, the real binding-scenario choice experiment participants revealed a slightly 
lower willingness to pay for private agency certified food grains with permissible levels of aflatoxin below 
20 ppb. We find very low willingness to pay for aflatoxin-free food grains among traders, millers in the 
food grain value chain in India. The traders might not be willing to pay in this experiment because we test 
a process certification instead of a product certification. Traders might not believe that the process of storing 
grains in hermetic bags leads to aflatoxin-free grains, and/or they may be concerned that consumers would 
not be willing to pay a premium for grains stored using this process.  We discuss the implications of this 
demand gap and strategies to address the market failures associated with the supply chain structure and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Food safety is a major problem in developing countries, impacting human welfare and the 
economy. Low and middle-income countries in Asia and Africa that make up 41 percent of the world’s 
population account for 53 percent of all foodborne diseases (Jaffee, Henson, Unnevehr, Grace, & Cassou, 
2019). The effects of poverty and malnutrition in poor countries exacerbate the detrimental effects of the 
food borne diseases. Unsafe food also causes lost labor productivity and expenses for various medical 
treatments. The total productivity loss associated with food borne diseases in low and middle-income 
countries is estimated at US$95.2 billion and treatment costs are estimated at US$15 billion aggregating to 
at least US$110 billion every year (Jaffee et al., 2019). 
Among unsafe food, aflatoxins are highly carcinogenic mycotoxin produced by Aspergillus flavus, 
a fungus commonly found in soils and on grain and legume crops (Aggarwal et al., 2018). Aflatoxins can 
contaminate cereals, oilseeds, spices, tree nuts, chilies, black pepper, corn, groundnuts, pistachios, dried 
fruit and fig, raising global health and economy concerns (Alshannaq & Yu, 2017). Williams et al. (2004) 
point that aflatoxin is a hepatotoxic, carcinogenic, immunosuppressive and antinutritional contaminant in 
many food varieties and suggests that aflatoxin has several established consequences depending on the level 
of exposure such as risk of cancer, effects on childhood nutrition among others. Individuals who are already 
infected with Hepatitis B are at higher risk of liver cancer resulting from aflatoxin contamination 
(Groopman, Kensler, & Wild, 2008). The CDC  (2012) claim that 4.5 billion people in developing countries 
are exposed to aflatoxins.  
Beyond costs associated with consuming aflatoxins, aflatoxin contamination can also cause 
economic harm in markets outside the country. Food safety is an important requirement for access to global 
trade and for high-value domestic markets (Ashraf, Giné, & Karlan, 2009). Even some of the good quality 
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food produced in low income countries may be rejected for export, resulting in millions of US dollars as 
losses (Wu, 2004; Wu et al., 2008). 
 Ensuring and preserving food safety relies on stakeholders in the value chain that include farmers, 
traders, food companies, government regulators, food scientists and the consumers. The ability and the 
incentives generated to the stakeholders are key factors that affect food safety. Economic theory suggests 
that given sufficient demand, firms should have an incentive to ensure food safety, but these incentives are 
not sufficient sometimes. Since buyers cannot readily determine the quality or safety of a food product by 
a brief examination, the incentives may be reduced to the firm that provides safe food. Thus, the market 
outcome may fail to achieve the efficient amount of food safety. Market failure may arise when (1) 
individual market participants have market power and influence the outcomes of the market, (2) some 
participants are asymmetrically informed about the products, or (3) market participants do not bear the costs 
and benefits equally. 
Extracting from the fact that food grains are generally bought, processed and sold by traders and 
millers with market power, there are two forms of market failure which might be identified in the setting of 
food safety (1) asymmetric information where the consumer is not fully informed of the food quality (2) 
externalities emerging if food-borne illness imposes wider costs on society rather than just impacting the 
participants. Typically, information asymmetry occurs with a credence good where quality cannot be 
determined at the time of purchase. Labeling could be used to reduce the impacts of imperfect information 
to the consumers, acting as an effective instrument for overcoming market failure due to information 
asymmetry. However, the label must be well known, understood and trusted all stakeholders in the supply 
chain.  
A food supply chain comprises various processes such as production, storage, processing, 
distribution and consumption. Rice and wheat are primarily used for human consumption. For maize, 
animal feed is the largest end user. Apart from feed, maize also goes to food processing for use in food 
additives and sweeteners.   
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In the study area, farmers tend to plant and harvest grains by themselves. Grain is frequently 
harvested mechanically, threshed and dried on farm. Sun drying is the most common form of drying.  
Farmers store grain on farm in jute bags until they sell their grains to local traders who in turn sell them to 
other larger traders, with a small number selling directly to a mill, retail, animal feed producer or directly 
to households (Skidmore, Baylis, Arends-Kuenning, & Michelson, 2017). In India, the Food Safety and 
Standards Authority has multiple functions such as creating and revising food standards, licensing and 
inspections, testing food in accredited laboratories, providing food safety training and certification. 
Nonetheless, there is no mandatory testing for aflatoxin contamination and no well-established brand for 
aflatoxin-free grain certification. In this study, we want to determine if there is a demand for grains certified 
as free from aflatoxin in the food supply chain. We attempt to answer this question using a discrete choice 
experiment involving two important stakeholders: consumers and traders. 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are an attribute-based preference valuation technique used to 
quantify preferences (utilities) for the desired commodities and allows to identify the importance of 
individual attributes of a product. “Price” attribute is included in the experiment to estimate a monetary 
measure of benefit of the included attributes (Kleinman, McIntosh, & Rya, 2002). Willingness to Pay 
(WTP) is the maximum price a given consumer accepts to pay for a product or service and could be used 
to measure the monetary value of the attributes of a preference even in hypothetical settings. In a DCE 
setting, participants choose their preferred alternative from several alternative choices where each choice 
is a unique combination. Although WTP may be estimated by other means, DCEs may provide richer 
information than other methods by observing how each attribute affect utility of the participants (Louviere, 
J.J., Hensher, D.A. and Swait, 2000) 
Various studies have illustrated that consumers are willing to pay a premium for food products that 
are appropriately labeled by credible agencies. A study in China found that consumers were willing to pay 
a premium for safer dairy products (Yan, 2014). Another study found that Thai consumers were willing to 
pay 117–180 percent more for food with safety labels (Wongprawmas, Canavari, & Waisarayutt, 2014). 
Liljenstolpe (2011) found that consumers preferred safe food and animal welfare of value-added pork 
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attributes. However, Jie Bai (2016) reported that consumers did not pay more for quality differentiation for 
watermelons in China. After one year, none of the sellers that participated in the study continued with 
quality differentiation since the increase in profits were not enough to provide the higher quality. In this 
thesis, we estimate the demand for food safety through the elimination of asymmetric information that 
typically creates the market failure. We first provide information about the ill effects of aflatoxins to 
consumers and traders and then determine the demand for certified aflatoxin-free grains. The end consumers 
were presented with a product-based certification whereas the traders were presented with process-
certification. Then we compare the specified WTP of these different actors in the supply chain to determine 
if demand is consistent across the supply chain. Finally, we conduct a cost benefit analysis to determine 
whether the demand for certification from consumers is sufficient to cover the costs of implementing a food 
safety system.  
This study makes two main contributions. First, we test rice, wheat and maize samples from small 
farmers for aflatoxin contamination and find a high incidence of contamination, thus confirming the 
presence of toxins in food grains. Second, we estimate the impact of providing aflatoxin information to 
retail consumers, traders and other supply chain intermediaries on their willingness to pay for certified 
aflatoxin-free grains in India. We study the entire value chain of the three major food grains in India to 
understand the gaps in demand and incentive structures for food safety. 
Aflatoxin production in crops occurs in fields when crops are subjected to drought, stress, high 
temperatures or during prolonged drying. However, molds producing aflatoxin grow exponentially during 
traditional multi-month storage due to high heat and humidity (Hell, Mutegi, & Fandohan, 2010). Villers, 
Navarro, & Bruin (2008) describe that the aflatoxin mold growth is beyond 65 percent during storage along 
with high relative humidity. A field study in Mali show that traditional storage for more than 2 months 
causes rapid growth of aflatoxins (Waliyar et al., 2002). Kumar, Mishra, Dubey, & Tripathi, 2007 explained 
that a large amount of cereal and grains are contaminated by mycotoxin producing molds during storage 
period. Such molds and toxins create quality loss and a threat in the food value chain (De Saeger & 
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Logrieco, 2017). Thus, the often-neglected portion of the aflatoxin contamination is during the prolonged 
storage periods in humid conditions.  
Usage of improved storage technology and proper handling can significantly reduce storage losses 
(Costa, 2014). Modern safe storage methods use hermetic storage structures that create an unbreathable 
atmosphere without the use of chemicals, fumigants or pumps and can be used during post-harvest storage 
to stop the growth of Aspergillus flavus. This technology is gaining popularity to store cereals, pulses, 
coffee and other grains in developing countries. When hermetic bags are sufficiently airtight, they 
drastically inhibit mold growth and thereby inhibit aflatoxin expression. Since molds require oxygen and 
humidity, the natural respiration of the insects and other microorganisms and respiration of the commodity 
itself, will use up the available oxygen faster than any residue leakage. After 10 days to 2 weeks, this results 
in an unbreathable atmosphere for the molds. This does not kill the molds, however the unbreathable 
atmosphere arrests the development of mold (Philippe Villers, 2014). Rice and other grain seeds are 
predominantly stored in ultra-hermetic enclosures instead of air-conditioned or refrigerated facilities 
(Philippe Villers & Today, 2009). The World Food Program (WFP) reported that the hermetic storage units 
were very efficient in killing the pests without the usage of phosphine fumigation in their Action Research 
Trial in both Uganda and Burkina Faso. Another study has stated that the aflatoxin producing ability of 
Aspergillus flavus was reduced at high concentrations of carbon-dioxide (Tefera et al., 2011). Hence various 
studies prove that these bags are cost-effective and practical, avoiding the usage of pesticides and 
insecticides on grains. Since hermetic bags arrest mold growth in grains due to the inhibitory atmosphere, 
we include a hypothetical attribute in the study were traders are provided with grains that are certified with 
storage in hermetically sealed bags, to determine the awareness and demand for hermetic structure storage 
among traders.  
For aflatoxin levels below 20 ppb, retail consumers are willing to pay nearly 30 percent more than 
the current market price for food grains when certified by private agencies and nearly 18 percent more when 
certified by a government food quality certification agency. The traders are willing to pay no more than the 
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existing price to the farmers for aflatoxin free, hermetically sealed grains. Though the consumers are willing 
to pay a premium, the traders create a huge gap in the supply chain with limited willingness to pay for afla-
toxin free, hermetically stored grains. The consumers might be willing to pay more since they were provided 
with a product certification whereas the traders were faced with a process certification. We note that this is 
a process certification rather than a product certification. Hence, the willingness to pay for the process 
depends on the extent of their belief that the process leads to better quality of grains. Since hypothetical 
choice experiments are sometimes criticized for the potential overestimation of WTP  (Camerer & Hogarth, 
1999), in this study we employ a real choice experiment in a city and a village in India. With the revealed 
experimental treatment, the participants used their own money when making a payment; the incentive-
compatible mechanism mimics as closely as possible the everyday purchasing decision. Finally, we perform 
a cost-benefit analysis to understand if farmers secure profits by obtaining labeled certification for their 


















Disease outbreaks due to the consumption of contaminated and hazardous food are a frequent 
problem worldwide. The major sources contributing to food contamination are microorganisms, especially 
fungi, which produce low-molecular-weight compounds as secondary metabolites which has toxic 
properties that is referred as mycotoxins (Bhat, Rai, & Karim, 2010). Mold infestation still remains a 
challenging problem despite extensive research (Munkvold, 2003).  
Among various mycotoxins, aflatoxins are major harmful toxins that cause illness in both humans 
and animals (Boutrif, 1998). Aflatoxins are metabolites of several widely distributed toxin producing strains 
of fungi especially of Aspergillus flavus or Asperfillus parasiticus. A. flavus is an omnipresent organism, 
so the potential for toxin production is worldwide. Of all crops, maize and groundnuts are highly susceptible 
to the fungus and are consumed widely (Khlangwiset, Shephard, & Wu, 2011). Aflatoxins are unobservable 
with no effect on taste, odor, color in grains that are infected. The major aflatoxins are B1, B2, G1 and G2, 
which could poison the body through many channels such as respiratory, mucous or cutaneous routes, 
resulting in overactivation of the inflammatory response (Romani, 2004). These fungi can lead to serious 
threats to human and animal health by causing several complications such as hepatotoxicity, teratogenicity 
and immunotoxicity among others (Amaike & Keller, 2011). Techniques to eliminate aflatoxin includes 
physical and chemical methods. It is very difficult to kill aflatoxins during cooking. Rustom (1997) reported 
that aflatoxins decompose at temperatures of 237 - 306 °C. Dua et al. (2012) reported that both 
pasteurization and boiling did not influence the level of aflatoxins present in milk. However, boiling corn 




Growth of aflatoxins occurs during cultivation and storage of the grains depending on the practices 
and conditions. Among other post-harvest activities inadequate drying, length of storage and poor storage 
conditions lead to growth of aflatoxins in the grains (Gnonlonfin et al., 2013). In developing countries, 
where the use of contaminated grain cannot always be avoided, aflatoxins affect both human and animal 
health (Abbas, 2005). Continuous testing during processing, handling and storage have mostly eliminated 
the aflatoxin risk among consumers in the developed nations. Due to poor management, many individuals 
are exposed to aflatoxin in developing countries (Strosnider et al., 2006).  
Various reports of outbreak and mass causalities due to aflatoxin occur worldwide (Bulatao-jaym, 
Almero, Castro, Jardeleza, & Salamat, 1982). Occurrences of jaundice due to aflatoxicosis was recorded in 
Kenya repetitively during 1981, 2001, 2004 and 2005 (Lewis et al., 2005; Shephard, 2006), with mortality 
rates as high as 39% (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2004). Another outbreak of 
aflatoxicosis in England in 1960 caused the death of livestock population (BLOUNT & WP., 1961; Van 
Der Zijden et al., 1962) and later led to the discovery of the presence aflatoxin in groundnut meal 
contaminated by A. flavus (Hesseltine, 1979). Aflatoxins were also found in other crops especially maize 
(Chakrabarty, 1981; Shotwell, 1977) and cottonseed meal (Lillehoj, Lagoda, & Maisch, 2010). 
Aflatoxin B1 among all other types, is the most profuse aflatoxin and is considered to be the most 
toxic (Stark & News, 1980). Various studies has shown the detrimental effects of aflatoxin’s exposure on 
the liver (Sharmila Banu, Kumar, & Murugesan, 2009), testis (Faisal et al., 2008), kidney and heart (V. 
Sharma & Gupta, 2011), epididymis (Agnes & Akbarsha, 2001). It affects the functioning of liver and 
causes cirrhosis, hepatoma, hepatitis, liver cancer (Groopman et al., 2008) and also affect other organs such 
as kidney, myocardium, and muscles (Newberne, 1974). A study noted that lung cancer is also a risk among 
workers that frequently handled aflatoxin contaminated grains (Kelly, J. D., Eaton, D. L., Guengerich, F. 
P., & Coulombe Jr, 1997). Additionally, aflatoxin leads to decreased immunity in animals (Fernández, 
Hernández, Verde, & Sanz, 2000) and reduces immunization efficacy in children leading to enhanced risk 
of infections (Hendrickse, 1999). Various literature suggests that aflatoxin is also associated with 
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kwashiorkor which is a nutritional disorder, and growth retardation among children (Coulter, J. B. S., 
Hendrickse, R. G., Lamplugh, S. M., Macfarlane, S. B. J., Moody, J. B., Omer, M. I. A., 1986). A study 
showed that the weight of the new born babies are also affected if mothers have taken aflatoxin in their 
food while pregnancy (Abdulrazzaq, Osman, & Ibrahim, 2003). Negative correlation between aflatoxin and 
birth weight has also been established (Abdulrazzaq, Osman, Yousif, & Trad, 2004). 
Health impacts of aflatoxin are largely felt in the developing countries; Liu & Wu (2010) reported 
that about 40% of cases of aflatoxin-induced liver cancer were in Africa, 27% in South East Asia, 20% in 
the Western Pacific and 10% in the Eastern Mediterranean area. A study compared the population risk 
between Kenya and France and highlighted that a greater burden is placed on developing nations due to 
aflatoxin contamination (Shephard, 2006). In 2004, consumption of heavily aflatoxin-contaminated maize 
was connected to more than a hundred deaths in Kenya (Azziz-Baumgartner et al., 2005). A study 
conducted in Philippines among people with liver cancer showed 440% higher consumption of aflatoxin as 
compared to the control group (Bulatao-jaym et al., 1982). The presence of aflatoxin in the blood of people 
from Nepal that consumed contaminated food and feed was found. (Denning, Sykes, Wilkinson, & Morgan, 
1990). More than 11% children with Kwashiorkor (a nutritional disorder) exhibited aflatoxin in their blood 
(Coulter, J. B. S., Hendrickse, R. G., Lamplugh, S. M., Macfarlane, S. B. J., Moody, J. B., Omer, M. I. A., 
1986).  
Especially in India, multiple incidents related to aflatoxins have occurred in the past. The word 
‘aflatoxicosis’ had appeared in public news of India in the 1960s referring the sudden death of 2219 chicks 
in poultry farms of Mysore and other parts in Karnataka (Gopal & Zaki, 1969). In 1974, an outbreak of 
hepatitis that lasted for two months was reported due to aflatoxin in Gujrat and Rajasthan in India, resulting 
in 106 deaths (Krishnamachari, Bhat, Nagarajan, & Tilak, 1975). Post-mortem examination of dead birds 






Most aflatoxin limits are set for the following four strains of aflatoxin; B1, B2, G1, G2. Permissible 
aflatoxin content in all food commodities for sale in the Indian market is 30 μg/kg or ppb (R. K. Sharma & 
Parisi, 2016). The European Union has strict limits for cereals, groundnuts, oilseeds, almonds and pistachios 
that are consumed by humans at 4 ppb (European Commission, 2016). At the United States, 20 ppb of 
aflatoxin contamination is permitted for any food products for human consumption (Mitchell, Bowers, 
Hurburgh, & Wu, 2016). Ghana and Kenya have limits of 15 ppb and 10 ppb respectively (Gajate-Garrido, 
Hoffmann, Magnan, & Opoku, 2016).  
Storage 
Aflatoxin contamination can occur anytime in the field, or during harvest, transport and storage of 
the grains. (Adel & Awad, 2009). Jacobsen (2008) reported that inappropriate storage conditions lead to 
aflatoxin contamination in wheat and barley. Various studies suggest that the factors that affect 
contamination include the climate type of the region, the genotype of the crop, soil type, minimum and 
maximum daily temperatures, and daily net evaporation. (Bankole & Mabekoje, 2004; BROWN et al., 
2001; Fandohan, Gnonlonfin, Hell, Marasas, & Wingfield, 2005; Elisabete Y. S. Ono et al., 1999). The 
contamination could also be endorsed if the crop is stressed due to drought, insects, poor timing of harvest, 
heavy rains during harvest or inadequate drying before storage (HAWKINS, WINDHAM, & WILLIAMS, 
2016; Hell, Cardwell, Setamou, & Poehling, 2000; E. Y.S. Ono et al., 2002; Turner et al., 2005). Food items 
that are stored for a long time before distribution and consumption are prone to aflatoxin contamination due 






Cost of Mycotoxin 
  A study in Kenya stated that welfare gains could have been obtained if the amount of maize 
discarded due to high aflatoxin levels were decreased, if the cost of sampling and testing for aflatoxin levels 
was reasonable and if the administrative costs to enforce regulatory systems were low (De Groote et al., 
2016). The cost of aflatoxin infection specifically to the agriculture sector was reported at $6.9 million or 
$100 million based on both low and high contamination hypothesis (Lubulwa, Siriacha, Markwell, & Pitt, 
2015). The combined social cost that includes product spoilage, human death and disability, reduced 
livestock productivity from aflatoxin contamination of maize and groundnuts to Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand in 1991 was estimated at US$ 371.4 million (Lubulwa & Davis, 1994).  
Demand for Food Safety 
Infants, young children, pregnant women, people with illness are particularly vulnerable to the 
health threats posed by unsafe food. Every year, 220 million children suffer from diarrheal diseases and 
96000 die (World Health Organization, 2017). Increased disposable incomes and urbanization are some of 
reasons for consumers’ preferences towards higher-quality consumption goods that has resulted in their 
higher willingness to pay (Ernst & Young, 2006). Consumers’ attitude toward the safety of foods are 
strongly associated with how much they trust both the food industry and government agencies that are 
responsible for ensuring food safety (Wilcock, Pun, Khanona, & Aung, 2004).  
Certification 
 
Food quality has several unobservable characteristics, including food safety. Food safety regulation 
is a device used to correct perceived market imperfection (Antle, 1999). Along with private institutions, 
government certification can also play a vital role to guarantee the safety and quality of food. (Lu, Wu, 
Wang, & Xu, 2016). 
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Consumers cannot assess quality attributes of food at the time of purchase. Food items include 
experience attributes which are qualities that are revealed during or after the consumption of the good. Food 
also has credence attributes which are qualities that the consumer believes to be present in a product even 
if they cannot be identified, experienced and inspected before or after consumption. Food safety can 
encompass experience and credence attributes. In both cases, consumers need to be assured of the quality 
of those attributes before being willing to pay for them. Preferences towards credence attributes in food 
have been reported in several studies (Saunders, Tait, Guenther, & Dalziel, 2015; Guenther, Saunders, 
Dalziel, Rutherford, & Driver, 2015). Hoffmann & Moser (2017) used data from more than 900 maize flour 
samples in Kenya to determine the relationship between price and aflatoxin-contamination. They find a 
negative correlation between price and contamination at the brand level, consistent with the expected 
positive relationship between branding and food quality. An analysis in Kenya stated that only 33% of the 
consumers bought branded maize flour (Fiedler et al., 2014). This information problem can be solved when 
firms build a brand and create a reputation for the quality of food sold. These firms have advantage of a 
premium for the brand equity. Birol, Karandikar, Roy, & Torero (2015) assessed the WTP for food safety 
and organics in grapes in India and confirmed that informed consumers were more likely to purchase labeled 
grapes. 
Signaling refers to any activity of one part whose purpose is to impact the perception and thereby 
the actions of other parties (Hörner, 2008). Signaling the quality of food when it is not observable to 
consumers can be done by certification, which acts as a proxy to transform unobservable credence attributes 
into observable attributes. Mathew (2014) studied the influence of food attributes on consumer choices. 
Their results indicated that signaling various food attributes influenced choice options and credence 
attributes had the highest choice share. This was followed by search and experience attributes. Price on the 
other hand, did not influence consumer choice. The participants seemed less price sensitive to the various 
levels of attributes provided in the choice options. 
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Ding & Veeman (2015) found that Chinese consumers bought branded rather than non-branded 
milk products and milk products that carried quality certifications were preferred. In markets characterized 
by asymmetric information, quality signaling was important for both consumers and farmers/traders. 
However, incentives for voluntary disclosure of nutritional content by food processing companies did not 
mostly result in consistent quality signals to consumers (Mojduszka & Caswell, 2000). 
The Food Safety Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) came into existence under Food Safety and 
Standards Act, 2006. It covers all the global food safety standards placed down by WTO such as goods 
manufacturing practices (GMP), good hygienic practice (GHP), hazard analysis critical control point 
(HACCP) (Mahajan, Garg, & Sharma, 2014). Private certification provides a guarantee that the products 
they certify meet certain criteria that is specified by professional associations, standards organizations, and 
government agencies. In many instances, private certification exceeds limits that hamper government 
regulation. While government frequently lacks resources to develop, implement, and enforce regulations, 
private certification can generate fees in the process to cover these costs (Lytton, 2014). 
Willingness to pay (WTP) 
 
Consumer WTP for the most important attributes in the Choice Experiment (CE) decreases when 
the number of attributes increases from three to four, while the WTP for the most vital attributes increases 
when the number of attribute increase from four to five. The changes in the WTP for attributes depend on 
their relationships with the newly added attributes to the choice experiment and the number of attributes in 
CEs (Gao & Schroeder, 2007). 
Studies suggest that Kenyan consumers are willing to pay a premium of 23.9% on average, for 
aflatoxin free maize compared to clean, untested maize (De Groote et al., 2016). Hoffmann & Gatobu  
(2014) find that Kenyan consumers take unobserved factors into account when deciding the usage and price 
of maize. They were willing to pay a 7.4% premium for aflatoxin-safe maize compared to cleaned and 
sorted maize obtained from the market. Combined results from  studies suggested that Kenyan consumers 
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will pay a premium for aflatoxin-safe maize and take unobserved factors into account when deciding how 
to use maize and how much to pay for maize (De Groote et al., 2016; Hoffmann & Gatobu, 2014) 
 Junfei Bai, Zhang, & Jiang (2013) found that urban Chinese consumers have a strong desire for 
traceable milk, but their preference for traceable milk is largely related to the associated certificate issuers. 
Another study, using choice experiments, assessed Chinese consumers’ WTP for food safety attributes in 
pork; results showed that Chinese consumers were willing to pay more for food safety certified pork. They 
were willing to pay double the price for government certified pork, 70 per cent more for privately certified 
pork and 50 per cent more for pork certified by assurance schemes (Ortega, Wang, Wu, & Olynk, 2011). 
In contrast, Birol et al. (2015) assessed Indians’ WTP for food safety and organics in grapes and found that 
the price did not influence the participants’ choice of grapes; however, more than 50% of the respondents 















Chapter 3: Data 
 
 
We conducted face-to-face interviews during October and November 2018 in Gujarat and Bihar, 
India for both consumers and traders. For the consumer survey, participants were surveyed from 
Ahmedabad, Jamnagar, Navsari in Gujarat. In Bihar, we surveyed participants from Bhagalpur, Samastipur, 
Muzaffarpur and Patna We conducted the choice survey for grains with different attributes among 
consumers and traders. We chose rice, wheat and maize to represent the staple food commonly consumed 
in the Indian diet, that are also commonly affected by aflatoxins. Data was collected for three stated choice 
experiments at the consumer level for rice, wheat and maize grains respectively; two revealed choice 
experiments at the consumer level for rice and wheat; one stated choice experiment at the trader level for 
all grains in general. Number of participants in the choice experiment are as follows: Consumer Stated 
Choice Experiment: 102 rice consumers, 101 wheat consumers, 100 maize consumers. Consumer Revealed 
Choice Experiment: 50 rice consumers, 50 wheat consumers. Trader Stated Choice Experiment: 105 traders 
from Bihar, in the districts of Banka, Begusarai, Bhagalpur and Samastipur were surveyed. 
Choice sets 
 
The attributes used in the model were identified following discussions with grain traders and 
consumers in Bihar, India. Since food safety involves several characteristics of food quality, mostly 
unobservable to consumers, we study aflatoxin contamination in this experiment, which shares the 
characteristic of being unobservable to consumers. Aflatoxins are commonly found in many grains in India 
and could be a significant determinant of choice for consumers and traders in the food value chain. Due to 
the unobservable feature, most of the consumers are not aware of its presence and the detrimental effects 
in the purchased grains. The legally permitted levels of aflatoxin contamination in food grains varies 
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between 10 to 30 parts per billion (ppb) around the world. We use 20ppb of aflatoxin contamination as a 
safe limit for consumption while presenting the choice sets to the survey participants. 
Since food quality is unobservable, an effective instrument for guaranteeing safety could be more 
useful to inform the consumers. One such instrument can be reliable certification systems. The Indian 
Government has established various food safety regulators such as Food Safety and Standards Authority of 
India (FSSAI). However, due to the past incidents associated with food safety in India, one might 
hypothesize that consumers do not believe in the government regulators. Therefore, we provide a 
certification label as an attribute to the grains to act as an additional proof for quality of grains provided at 
the time of purchase. By adding a private certification level to the certification attribute, we try to determine 
the demand for private certification labels in India. While the consumers were faced with government 
versus private certification choice, the traders were provided with another type of certification choice. We 
use the fact that hermetically-sealed bags reduce the growth of molds that generate aflatoxin in our 
experiment, and hence provide the traders a hypothetical certification choice where the grains are stored in 
hermetically sealed bags during storage. 
To determine the demand for grains with low aflatoxin levels, we include different price levels as 
an attribute. Since the prices for each grain type varied among cities, we use marginal price levels. The 
consumers were presented with price/kg whereas the traders were presented with price/quintal in the choice 
survey based on the day to day transaction. The attributes and their respective levels for consumers and 







Table 1. Consumer attributes and levels in the CE 
Attribute Description Level 


















Amount the consumers are willing to pay 





Aflatoxin-levels present in the grains at 





Type of certification applicable to the 
grains/product at the time of purchase. The 
Private certification includes the private 
laboratories that provide food safety 




- Rs. 2 
- Rs. 5 
- Rs. 10 
- Rs. 15 
 
 
- Less than 20ppb 
- 20 – 50ppb 




- Government Certified 
- Private Certified 
 
We set the aflatoxin attribute at three levels (1) less than 20 ppb (2) 20-50 ppb (3) More than 50 
ppb. Though the regulatory limit for aflatoxin is 30ppb in India, we set the permissible level at 20ppb since 
most of the countries have stricter regulatory limits. The US has a limit of 20ppb whereas other countries 
such as Ghana and Kenya have limits of 15 and 10ppb respectively. Setting regulatory limits at 30ppb might 
hinder global trade opportunities. The aflatoxin attribute captures consumers value for food quality and 
food safety. Certification attribute is divided into government and private certifications. As mentioned in 
the table, private certification includes the laboratories that provide food safety labels. We study the demand 
for certification agencies in India given the failure of food safety measures in the past and estimate which 




Table 2. Trader attributes and levels for grains in the CE 
Attribute Description Level 


















Amount the traders are willing to pay 





Aflatoxin-levels present in the grains at 





Hypothetical certification schemes farmers 
can hold if their grains were stored in 
hermetically sealed airtight bags  
 
 
- Rs. 20 
- Rs. 50 
- Rs. 100 
- Rs. 150 
 
 
- Less than 20ppb 
- 20 – 50ppb 




- Hermetic Storage 
- No Hermetic Storage 
 
In the traders’ choice experiment, we introduced hypothetical certification labeling for grains stored 
in hermetically sealed bags during storage post-harvest. Based on our discussion with traders, they are 
aware of the benefits of hermetic storage such as improved grain quality, controlled moisture levels hence 
we included this hypothetical certification to examine their demand amongst traders for the process of 
storing in hermetically sealed bags. 
Statistical design and software 
 
We used an orthogonal factorial design to ensure efficient design. We used SAS to generate the 
choice set as a full factorial design for three attributes with four, three and two levels respectively. Twenty-
four choice sets were randomly blocked into three different versions, each consisting eight choice sets. We 
used D-efficiency to determine the efficiency of the experimental design. It scales from 0 to 100, where a 
score of 100 denotes that the design is orthogonally balanced, and the variance of the estimated coefficients 
are minimized. Various studies use D-efficiency as the criterion for the appropriate design for choice 
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experiments involving foods (Onozaka & Mcfadden, 2011; Lusk, 2011 and Loureiro & Umberger, 2007). 
The D-efficiency score for this design is 98.9. Each participant was assigned one of the three blocks 
randomly. From the eight choice sets, the participants were asked to select their preferred choices. The opt-
out option was included in the choice set to avoid bias and to predict better purchasing behavior. Participants 
were able to choose the “current scenario” option when either choice A or choice B is not attractive. This 
option can be treated as status quo or baseline alternative, whose inclusion in the survey is important in 
achieving welfare measures that are consistent with demand theory ((Louviere, J.J., Hensher, D.A. and 
Swait, 2000). One of the eight choice sets that were presented to the survey participants is given below. 
Figure 1. Example of choice set presented to respondents  
 
Figure 2. Example of choice set presented to traders 
 
The survey for the consumers and traders consisted of three components. The first section consisted 
of an information section that explained the detrimental effects of aflatoxin contamination and the 
permissible levels of aflatoxins in food grains. We also informed the participants that around 37 percent of 
our tested grains in India had aflatoxin levels above the safe limit of 20 ppb. We explained the differences 
Market attributes Option A Option B Option C  
Price Pay Rs.50 extra Pay Rs.150 extra I prefer current price and 
current mycotoxin levels 
present in grains with no 
certification 
Certification YES YES 
Mycotoxin 20 to 50ppb Less than 20ppb 




and existing scenario of government versus private certification and asked them to state their preferences. 
The field enumerators explained the context in which the choices should be made and described each 
attribute to ensure uniform comprehension of the attributes and the levels. In the second section, information 
on households’ and food purchase decision-makers’ socio-economic characteristics were collected 
following by the section with the actual choice sets. 
 For the revealed choice experiment, we chose to conduct the experiment at Big Bazaar (a Walmart-
style grocery store) in Patna and at villages in Bihar. After they completed the eight choice sets from the 
survey, a number was randomly drawn between number one and eight. The number corresponded to the 
















Chapter 4: Model 
 
 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are widely used among the various stated preference eliciting 
methods. DCEs are based on Lancaster ‘s theory (1974) of consumer choice, which states that commodities 
can be described in terms of underlying attributes or characteristics and that consumers value these 
attributes rather than commodities themselves. DCEs enable quantification of the premium and 
disaggregate the attributes in the given choice.  
We use a random utility model for the empirical analysis. The consumer is assumed to choose from 
j alternatives. The utility that consumer i derives from choosing the alternative j comprises two parts, a 
systematic and a random component. This can be expressed as: 
Uij = Vij + ɛij 
where Vij in the utility function describes the systematic component. Vij is determined by the attributes of 
the given choice or product and is the observed part of the ith consumers utility. ɛij describes the stochastic 
term which is the unobserved part of the ith consumers utility. When rational consumers maximize their 
utility, the choice problem involves a comparison of utilities related to each of the j alternatives with 
consumers trying to choose alternatives that yield the maximum utility. Assuming Yi is a random variable 
that denotes the choice outcome, then the probability that individual i chooses alternative j over other 
alternatives is given by: 
P(Yi = j) = P(Vij + ɛij) > P(Vik + ɛij) 
∀𝑘 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑗;  𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
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When the researcher surveys a representative sample, a distribution of random unobserved sources 
of utility will exist. The model imposes several well-known restrictions (McFadden et al., 1977;  McFadden, 
1978); (Train, 1986). One of the two assumptions is that the coefficients of variables that enter the model 
are assumed to be the same for all individuals. This implies that different individuals with the same observed 
characteristics have the same taste for each factor entering the model. The second assumption is that the 
models exhibit the property of “independence from irrelevant alternatives” (IIA). Because of this property, 
the models necessarily predict that a change in the attributes of one alternative change the probabilities of 
the other alternatives proportionately, which can be unrealistic in many settings (Train, 1998).  
In this study, we estimate the demand for food safety with a specification that is a generalization 
of the logit but avoids the above-mentioned assumptions. We estimate a mixed logit model for the discrete 
choice experiment. These models are also called random-parameters logit (RPL) (Train, 1998), random-
coefficients logit (C. R. Bhat, 1998) and error-components logit (Brownstone & Train, 1998). The mixed 
logit model generalizes logit by allowing the coefficients of observed variables to randomly differ among 
people instead of being fixed. Therefore, the model does not exhibit the IIA property and the restrictive 
substitution patterns. The variation in coefficients across respondents implies that the unobserved utility 
associated with any alternative is necessarily correlated over time for each decision-making individual 
(Train, 1998). This correlation is incorporated into the estimation when there are observations on more than 
one choice situation for each person (Train, 1998). 
Mixed logit model 
 
Mixed logit is a highly flexible model that can approximate any random utility model (Daniel 
McFadden & Train, 2000a). It removes the limitations of standard logit by allowing for random taste 
variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation in unobserved factors over time. Assuming the 
utility of person n for alternative j in a choice situation t, 
Unjt = β’nXnjt + ɛnjt 
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where Xnjt is the observed attributes vector, βn is the respective utility coefficients vector that vary randomly 
over people, and ɛnjt is the random term representing the unobserved utility component. Xnjt can include 0/1 
terms to allow for alternative-specific constants, attribute levels and continuous attributes. The random term 
is assumed to be iid extreme value. This assumption means that the probability of a person n choosing 









The utility coefficients of each person are not observed by the researcher although it is known 
that the coefficients vary over each individual. The cumulative distribution function of βn (individual 
preference parameters) in the population is F(β|θ) which depends on the parameters θ. The distribution 
can be continuous or discrete, and different elements in β may follow different distributions which 
includes some being fixed, and the elements of β may be correlated with each other (Hess & Train, 2017). 
The choice probability for the person’s order of choices, given the available information is 
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡 = ∫ 𝐿𝑛𝑖𝑡(𝛽)𝑓(𝛽|𝜃) ⅆ𝛽 
where 𝑓 is the density associated with F. In this study the parameters θ, are characterized by the mean and 
variance-covariance matrix. This model has become the reference for stated choice studies due to the ability 
to account for preference heterogeneity and its flexibility in accommodating a variety of model 
specifications (Daniel McFadden & Train, 2000b). This specification can be generalized to panel data 
where each participant i makes repeated choices, if the parameters are constant across time or choice. The 
ratio of probabilities of two alternatives, j and h, depends also on attributes of alternatives other than j and 
h, since the mixed logit does not restrict substitution patterns as in the Multinomial Logit model. 
Each preference parameter in the random utility model represents the marginal utility of an attribute 
(∂U/ ∂xk = βk). The mean WTP estimates for an attribute k in a random parameter logit model can be 
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calculated as βk/βprice and this value could represent the entire sample if there is an insignificant σβ, which 








Chapter 5: Results 
 
 
This chapter presents results on the aflatoxin testing in sample grains, analysis of the data survey 
and the results from stated and revealed preference choice experiments. In the first section, we discuss the 
results from the sample testing for aflatoxin levels from local farmers. In the next section, we present the 
summary statistics and the results from the demand estimation of willingness to pay for aflatoxin-free grains 
in the supply chain through a discrete choice experiment for consumers and local traders. 
Aflatoxin Testing 
 
To motivate my discussion, we first tested aflatoxin levels from a total of 207 grain samples 
consisting of rice, wheat and maize grains from Bihar, India. The project collected 113 wheat samples, 55 
rice samples and 39 maize samples from the villages local farmers in the district of East Champaran at the 
Motihari block in Bihar and local public distribution systems i.e. fair price shops. We tested for aflatoxin 
levels at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) at $10 per sample. 
The following figures demonstrate the samples that had more than the regulatory limit of 20 ppb. We used 
the results to confirm the presence of aflatoxins in the information section of our survey to the consumers 









Figure 3. Aflatoxin samples collected in villages in the district of East Champaran, Bihar 
 
Figure 3 shows the geographic spread of the samples that were collected from farmers for the 
analysis. The samples were either collected from farmers or from a public distribution system (PDS) where 






Figure 4: Aflatoxin Levels collected from wheat samples with limit 20ppb 
From the above figure, we note that from the 113 wheat samples, 37 samples exceeded the safe 
limits for human consumption. The maximum amount of contamination was 91.2 ppb which is almost 4 






















Aflatoxin Testing - Wheat
Aflatoxins (µg/kg) Permissible Limit
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Figure 5: Aflatoxin Levels collected from rice samples with limit 20ppb
 
 
The rice samples had comparatively lower levels of aflatoxin contamination. Out of the 55 samples 
tested, 44 of them did not have any contamination, whereas the remaining 10 samples had aflatoxin levels 


























Aflatoxin Testing - Rice
Aflatoxins (µg/kg) Permissible Limit
29 
 
Figure 6: Aflatoxin Levels collected from maize samples with limit 20ppb 
 
In line with the previous studies, maize proved to be the crop most susceptible to aflatoxin damage. 
We tested 39 samples out of which 22 samples were free of contamination. However, the remaining 44 
percent of the samples contained detrimental levels. The highest level was 525 ppb, which is 26 times 
greater than the regulatory safe limit. 
 Table 3: Aflatoxin Contamination (ppb) with regulatory limit 20ppb 











































Table 3 provides a summary of the content of aflatoxins in the samples. We find that approximately 

















Aflatoxin Testing - Maize
Aflatoxins (µg/kg) Permissible Limit
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the permissible limit of 20ppb. The highest aflatoxin content recorded in our study was in the maize samples 
which is approximately 2627% more than the permissible limit. Our results match with other studies that 




For the consumer choice study, the distribution of regions for all the three grain types is spread 
across villages and cities to capture both the urban and rural population. The survey was conducted in in 
Ahmedabad, Jamnagar, Navsari in Gujarat. In Bihar, we surveyed participants from Bhagalpur, Samastipur, 
Muzaffarpur and Patna. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three blocks of the survey. A 
total of 303 end consumers were surveyed for the stated choice experiment; 102 for rice grains, 101 for 
wheat and 100 for maize. A total of 100 consumers were surveyed for the revealed choice experiment with 
50 participants for rice and 50 participants for wheat. 
Stated choice experiment  
The sample of respondents features almost the same number of females and males for all the three 










Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Respondents – Rice (N = 102) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
















No. of People  
 










Gender of survey respondent  
Female = 0; Male= 1 
 
Age of participant (in years) 
 
Total annual income of the household 
in INR 
 
Highest completed education 
Below 10th grade = 0, 
Completed 10th grade = 1, 
Completed 12th grade = 2, 
Completed College = 3 
 
Number of people in the household 
 
Number of children in the household 
 
Measures taken for Safe Water 
Consumption 
None=0; Filter=1; Boiling=2; 
Other=3 
 






















































From the table, the consumers surveyed for rice were aged between 23 and 90 with a mean age of 
40. Their mean income was 903,794 INR1 with a standard error of 841,708, where the lowest income was 
15000 INR and the highest was 2600000 INR. 60 percent of our sample had completed college and the 
remaining 40 percent had education levels below 12th grade. The mean number of people in the household 
were 4 with one child on an average. To estimate the attitudes of consumers towards health investment, the 
survey asked if they invested in safe water technology. About 31 percent of the sample did not use safe 
                                                          
1 USD  ̴ 70 INR 
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water technology, 54 percent use a filter for safe water consumption and the remaining 17 percent used 
other technologies to drink safe water. About 10% of the sample were not educated (below 10th grade), 12 
percent has completed 10th grade, 19 percent has completed 12th grade and 61 percent has completed 
college. From the statistics, the rice sample consumers are mostly educated. The mean quantity of rice 
purchased for a month was 13 kgs. The average price of rice was found to be INR 32.5 per kg. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Respondents – Wheat (N = 101) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
















No. of People  
 










Gender of survey respondent  
Female = 0; Male= 1 
 
Age of participant (in years) 
 
Total annual income of the household 
in INR 
 
Highest completed education 
Below 10th grade = 0, 
Completed 10th grade = 1, 
Completed 12th grade = 2, 
Completed College = 3 
 
Number of people in the household 
 
Number of children in the household 
 
Measures taken for Safe Water 
Consumption 
None=0; Filter=1; Boiling=2; 
Other=3 
 
Quantity of wheat consumed per 





















































The wheat consumers were aged between 23 and 78 where the income ranges from 25,000 INR to 
2,600,000 INR with a mean of 883,774 INR and a standard error of 844,968 INR. Around 60 percent of 
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our sample has completed college, 20 percent has completed 12th grade, 9 percent has completed 10th grade 
and 12 percent were uneducated. With an average of 4 people in the household, the mean number of children 
in the household was 1. The measures taken for safe water consumption demonstrated that 22 percent of 
the respondents did not invest in safe water technology, 63 percent invested in a water filter and the 
remaining 16 percent used other technologies. The mean quantity of wheat purchased for a month was 16.5 
kgs. The mean price of wheat was reported to be Rs. 27.5. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Respondents – Maize (N = 100) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
















No. of People  
 
 






Gender of survey respondent  
Female = 0; Male= 1 
 
Age of participant (in years) 
 
Total annual income of the household 
in INR 
 
Highest completed education 
Below 10th grade = 0, 
Completed 10th grade = 1, 
Completed 12th grade = 2, 
Completed College = 3 
 
Number of people in the household 
 
 
Number of children in the household 
 
Measures taken for Safe Water 
Consumption 























































 Since maize is not consumed directly, the survey asked questions regarding preferences for 
processed maize products like popcorn, corn flakes, sattu etc. It was found that more than 50 percent of the 
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respondents consumed popcorn, 22 percent consumed cornflakes, 11 percent consumed sattu and 2 percent 
consumed other maize products. The mean age of maize respondents was 42. Their income ranged between 
20,000 INR and 2,600,000 INR with an average of 917838 INR. Around 71 percent of our sample has 
completed college, 17% has completed 12th grade, 5 percent has completed 10th grade and 7 percent of the 
sample did not have an education. With an average of 4 people in the household, the mean number of 
children in the household was one. About 18 percent of the respondents did not invest in safe water 
technology, 66% invested in a water filter and 16% used other water filtrating technologies.  
From the summary statistics, we note that the consumers are similar across the three grain types. Most of 
the consumers are well educated and have a college degree. The income ranges were wide spread, with 
almost equal number of male and female in the survey.  
Revealed choice experiment 
Although discrete choice experiments are increasingly used in food demand analysis, little 
empirical evidence tests for the predictive value of the hypothetical situations in real life. So, this study 
aims to compare the stated preference in a discrete choice experiment with the revealed preference where 
respondents participated in a binding-scenario choice experiment. We performed the analysis near the point 
of sale at Big Bazaar which is a Walmart style grocery store in Patna. We performed the real choice 
experiment for rice and wheat, however, since maize is consumed mostly as processed food in India, we 








Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Choice experiment – Rice (N = 50) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
















No. of People  
 
 










Gender of survey respondent  
Female = 0; Male= 1 
 
Age of participant (in years) 
 
Total annual income of the household 
in INR 
 
Highest completed education 
Below 10th grade = 0, 
Completed 10th grade = 1, 
Completed 12th grade = 2, 
Completed College = 3 
 
Number of people in the household 
 
 
Number of children in the household 
 
Measures taken for Safe Water 
Consumption 
None=0; Filter=1; Boiling=2; 
Other=3 
 
























































 Fifty participants per grain participated and made purchases at the end of the survey. 64 percent of 
the rice purchasers were male. Age ranged from 25 to 55 with a mean age of 35. 62 percent of the sample 
completed college, 18 percent has completed 12th grade, 16 percent has completed 10th grade and 4 percent 
were not educated. When enquired about the safety measures taken to consumer safe water, 62 percent 
reported to use a water filter, 38 percent did not use any technology to consumer safe water. The average 




Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Choice Experiment – Wheat (N = 50) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
















No. of People  
 
 










Gender of survey respondent  
Female = 0; Male= 1 
 
Age of participant (in years) 
 
Total annual income of the household 
in INR 
 
Highest completed education 
Below 10th grade = 0, 
Completed 10th grade = 1, 
Completed 12th grade = 2, 
Completed College = 3 
 
Number of people in the household 
 
 
Number of children in the household 
 
Measures taken for Safe Water 
Consumption 
None=0; Filter=1; Boiling=2; 
Other=3 
 
Quantity of wheat consumed per 























































Over 76 percent of the wheat purchasers were male, the mean age of the respondents was 40. About 
80 percent completed college, 4 percent has completed 12th grade and 16 percent has completed 10th grade. 
In this group, there were no uneducated consumers. Income ranged between 160,000 INR to 4,000,000 
INR. Around 68 percent of the participants used a water filter and 32 percent did not use any technology to 
drink safe water. The mean quantity of wheat consumed per month was 22.6 kgs with average current price 
reported as Rs. 25.  
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The sample of consumers that participated in the revealed choice experiment were well educated 
with relatively higher incomes than the hypothetical choice group. Investment in health technology is 
almost the same in both the groups. The number of male buyers were more in the revealed experiment than 
the stated experiment. 
Traders  
Stated choice experiment 
To understand the gap in the demand for grains free of aflatoxin contamination, this study 
performed a stated choice experiment for the local traders in Bihar. The table below provides the summary 
of the sample in the study.  
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Traders - Grains (N = 105) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 



















Gender of survey respondent  
Female = 0; Male= 1 
 
Highest completed education 
Below 10th grade = 0, 
Completed 10th grade = 1, 
Completed 12th grade = 2, 
Completed College = 3 
 
Number of people in the household 
 
Buying price for rice per quintal in 
INR 










































Most of the traders informed that they procured grains from farmers. All interviewed small traders 
reported that they sold grains procured from farmers to other traders who sell more volume and to village 
consumers. From the sample, 22 percent had completed college, 51 percent had completed grade 12. All 
the traders surveyed in the sample were male. The average number of people per household were five. The 
reported mean rice price bought from farmers was Rs. 1240 per quintal and the mean price of wheat was 
Rs. 1289 per quintal.  
Estimation Results of Mixed Logit Model 
 
The RPL model has been estimated using the econometric software STATA 15.1. STATA uses 
maximum simulated likelihood to fit mixed logit models (Train, 2003). Randomness is assumed for the 
attribute parameters: certification and aflatoxin levels. These parameters are modelled as following a 
normal distribution. Some of the key socio-demographic characteristics are interacted with the attributes 
such as gender and the people who invest in health technology. Since in RPL models the socio-demographic 
variables can only be interacted with the variables of product attributes for every choice in the experiment’s 
choice set, a model with many socio-demographic explanatory variables would be too big to estimate the 
effects. The model considers government certification among the certification levels as the base category. 
50 – 100 ppb is considered as the base category or status quo among aflatoxin contamination. 
The estimation results from the mixed logit model for rice, wheat and maize stated choice 
experiments are presented and discussed in this section. All the choice experiments have a “no choice or 
current status” option. It is presented to the participants to scale the utilities among the various choice sets. 
The alternative specific constant (ASC) is included in the model, to explain the utility of status quo and to 
reduce bias. Haaijer, Kamakura, & Wedel (2001) suggest that an ASC should be included in the model.  
Consumers - Stated choice model 
To estimate the willingness to pay for the end consumers, we use a mixed logit model where 
attributes such as private certification, aflatoxin level: 0-20ppb and aflatoxin level: 20-50ppb are random. 
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The random parameters are introduced to account for the individual preference heterogeneity. The 
alternative specific constant captures the utility from status quo. The baseline attributes are Government 
Certification and aflatoxin level:50-100ppb.  
Table 10: Mixed logit model – Stated Preference Consumers 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Rice Wheat Maize 
Mean       
Alt. Specific Constant -0.387* -0.479* -0.499* 
  (0.188) (0.200) (0.202) 
        
Price -0.326*** -0.394*** -0.349*** 
  (0.0251) (0.0303) (0.0301) 
        
Private Certification 0.678** 0.605* 0.735** 
  (0.227) (0.284) (0.278) 
        
Alfatoxin: 0 - 20ppb 2.636*** 3.091*** 4.811*** 
  (0.267) (0.288) (0.441) 
        
Alfatoxin: 20 -50ppb -0.224 -0.342 -0.308 
  (0.398) (0.504) (0.432) 
SD       
Private Certification 1.419*** 2.251*** 1.580*** 
  (0.247) (0.294) (0.276) 
        
Alfatoxin: 0 - 20ppb 1.262*** 1.114*** 2.265*** 
  (0.257) (0.282) (0.331) 
        
Alfatoxin: 20 -50ppb 2.750*** 3.752*** 3.483*** 
  (0.417) (0.619) (0.615) 
Observations 2448 2424 2400 
AIC 1227.7 1111.7 1015.3 
Log lik. -605.9 -547.8 -499.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Model estimates including the means and the spread coefficients appear in Table 10. Looking at 
the β coefficients, the attribute aflatoxin level:20-50ppb was not statistically significant. The results were 
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similar for wheat and maize. The standard deviation for all the attributes were significant, meaning all the 
included attributes contribute to explain the strong preference heterogeneity among participants. The WTP 
captured from this model for all the three grains are given below. 
Table 11: Willingness to pay - Stated Preference Consumers (Rs/kg) 
 Private Certification Aflatoxin: 0-20ppb Aflatoxin: 20-50ppb 
WTP 
 























Table 11 displays the elicited WTP from consumers through the  mixlogit model. The table suggests 
that consumers are willing to pay around INR 2 more for a private agency certification than for government 
certification. This is due to the lack of confidence and trust in the government certification schemes amongst 
the consumers due to several past incidences related to food safety failures. 
Consumers - Revealed choice model 
The above model is used for the revealed preference experiment. The baseline attributes are 








Table 12: Mixed logit model – Revealed Preference Consumers 
  (1) (2) 
  Rice Wheat 
Mean     
Alt. Specific Constant -2.034*** -2.312*** 
  (0.345) (0.466) 
      
Price -0.600*** -0.818*** 
  (0.0618) (0.111) 
      
Private Certification 0.108 0.658 
  (0.349) (0.388) 
      
Alfatoxin: 0 - 20ppb 3.258*** 5.070*** 
  (0.487) (0.809) 
      
Alfatoxin: 20 -50ppb 2.373*** 2.419*** 
  (0.450) (0.447) 
SD     
Private Certification 1.489*** 1.182** 
  (0.385) (0.453) 
      
Alfatoxin: 0 - 20ppb 1.467*** 3.383*** 
  (0.421) (0.940) 
      
Alfatoxin: 20 -50ppb 1.107* 1.775** 
  (0.543) (0.618) 
Observations 1200 1200 
AIC 472.1 438.4 
Log lik. -228.0 -211.2 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 12 shows the model estimates including the means and the spread coefficients. From the β 
coefficients, all attributes except private certification for rice and wheat was statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for the aflatoxin level:0-20ppb attribute had the largest estimated beta, 
suggesting that the consumers were very sensitive to levels of aflatoxin that are within the permissible limit. 
The significant standard deviation for all included attributes suggests strong preference heterogeneity 
among participants who purchased the grains in the survey for both rice and wheat. 
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Table 13: Willingness to pay Revealed Choice Experiment (Rs/kg) 
 Private 
Certification 
Aflatoxin: 0-20ppb  Aflatoxin:20-50ppb 
WTP 
 
















Table 13 displays the elicited WTP from consumers through the revealed choice experiment. The 
consumers who were bound to purchase grains in the experiment, did not have a demand for private 
certification over government certification. The WTP reduced by 105% percent for aflatoxin:0 -20ppb in 
Rice and about 26% in Wheat. 
Traders - Stated choice model 
Mixed logit model is used to estimate the willingness to pay among traders for the hermetic bags 
and aflatoxin-free grains. The baseline attributes are Government Certification and aflatoxin level:50-
100ppb.  
Table 14: Mixed logit model - Traders 
  (1) 
  Grains 
Mean   
Alt. Specific Constant -2.487 
  (1.342) 
    
Price -0.424*** 
  (0.100) 
    
Hermetic Certification 4.911*** 
  (1.142) 
    
Aflatoxin: 0 - 20ppb 12.05*** 
  (2.531) 




Table 14 (cont.):  Mixed logit model – Traders 
 
Aflatoxin: 20 -50ppb 1.750 
  (0.950) 
SD   
Hermetic Certification 0.366 
  (1.079) 
    
Aflatoxin: 0 - 20ppb 5.078*** 
  (1.383) 
    
Aflatoxin: 20 -50ppb 6.838*** 
  (1.900) 
Observations 2520 
AIC 497.3 
Log lik. -240.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In the model, the attributes such as cost, hermetic storage certification and aflatoxin: 0-20ppb are 
statistically significant. The significant standard deviation for aflatoxin attributes suggests strong preference 
heterogeneity among traders for aflatoxin levels in grains. 
The table below exhibits the WTP for food safety attributes defined in the choice experiment among 
traders for all the grains in general. 
Table 15: Willingness to pay stated choice experiment for traders (Rs/kg) 
WTP Hermetic Storage 
Certification 
Aflatoxin: 0-20ppb Aflatoxin: 20-50ppb 
    





They are willing to pay Rs. 27.65 per quintal i.e. Rs. 0.27 per kg. This table suggests that the traders 
do not prefer to pay more for the process of storing grains in hermetically sealed bags. This might be due 
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to the lack of belief in the process which suggests storage in hermetic bags leads to lesser aflatoxin 
contamination.  
 We estimated the mixed logit model with gender interactions (see Table 24 in appendix) to study 
the differences in WTP for certification and aflatoxin-free grains among male and female consumers. The 
below table represents the willingness to pay for both stated and revealed preference experiments for the 
consumers. 
Table 16: Willingness to pay stated choice experiment for male and female consumers (Rs/kg) 
Grain Rice Wheat Maize 
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Private Certification -1.03 5.05 -2.27 4.49 -2.19 4.47 
Aflatoxin: 0-20ppb 7.64 8.7 7.52 8.46 18.6 9.08 
Aflatoxin: 20-50ppb -6.81 5.77 -11.9 5.46 -14.4 4.41 
 
Table 17: Willingness to pay revealed choice experiment for male and female consumers (Rs/kg) 
Attributes Rice Wheat 
Gender Male Female Male Female 
Private Certification 0.06 1.43 0.87 0.72 
Aflatoxin: 0-20ppb 4.03 7.93 6.78 5.97 




From Table 16 and Table 17, it can be noted that female participants are willing to pay more for 
private certification for all grain types. For both the aflatoxin levels, the female participants are willing are 
willing to pay more except for maize aflatoxin 0-20ppb and wheat aflatoxin 0-20ppb.  
 To examine if the consumers that invested in their health preferred to pay more than the others, we 
interacted a mixed logit model with the health investment term. Health investment measures if the 
participant has invested to consume safe water such as having a water filter, boiling water etc. Below are 
the results that differentiate between the participants that invested to drink safe water and the others.  
Table 18: Willingness to pay stated choice experiment for participants who invested in a water filter 
and others (Rs/kg) 
Grain Rice Wheat Maize 
Health Investment (Water Filter) NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Private Certification -0.73 3.47 -2.8 2.48 4.47 -2.19 
Aflatoxin: 0-20ppb 4.07 9.61 5.03 8.58 9.08 18.6 
Aflatoxin: 20-50ppb -8.69 2.45 -16.13 1.21 4.41 -14.4 
 
From Table 18, we see that all the participants who consumed safe water are willing to pay more 







Chapter 6: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 
To implement food safety throughout the food supply chain, it is important that each stake holder 
understands and contributes towards the end goal of safe food consumption. From the above results, it is 
seen that the consumers demand safe food with a willingness to pay an extra INR 10 per kg on average for 
aflatoxin-free grains. Though the consumers did not prefer to pay a significant amount for private 
certification, certification acts as a proxy, thereby providing signaling to the consumers. It is also to be 
noted that our analysis shows that traders had no willingness to pay for hermetic storage certification as 
well aflatoxin-free grains. In this section, we examine if securing certification provide incentives for 
farmers. 
Cost Benefit Analysis of Certification 
 
This section attempts to evaluate the cost and benefits of securing a certification for food quality. 
Certification is a voluntary market-based system that promotes good quality food grains through either 
government or third-party certification. Specifically, we want to determine whether the demand for 
certification from consumers and others in the supply chain is sufficient to cover the costs of implementing 
such a system.  
 To get measures of the cost of certification, we use examples of existing certification programs in 
India. There are government and private certifications for food quality, but agencies do not provide 
certifications specifically for absence of aflatoxin contamination. Therefore, we used the prices farmers 
paid for prevailing certification types such as National Programme for Organic Production (NPOP). NPOP 
provides organic farming certification and promotes organic farming. The standards for production and 




Ideal Certification Structure 
 Since there are no current certification structure for aflatoxin testing in India, an ideal certification 
system should test for aflatoxin-levels in multiple samples at different levels in the supply chain. Current 
charges for aflatoxin testing per sample at private labs in India are approximately USD $50. This cost would 
not be feasible for the small farmers. ICRISAT has developed a low-cost rapid aflatoxin detection device 
at a cost of USD $10. This could be expanded for commercial certification and branding purposes.   
 The steps in providing aflatoxin-level certification would ideally be like current organic 
certification structure in India where a series of activities are performed to ensure the quality and safety of 
the food grains before certification. The first stage will consist of application from the individual farmers 
or a group of farmers before sowing of the crops.  The crops would be monitored frequently from the fields 
even before harvest, as aflatoxin can develop during crop growth when the plants are subjected to a high 
stress condition. A fixed number of samples per unit area would be tested for aflatoxin at the time of harvest. 
Later, the samples would be tested for aflatoxin contamination during the storage process. Finally, the 
grains will be certified before the time of sales. The grains are certified at three different times to help 
farmers to prevent aflatoxin spread and help differentiate infected grains from the good quality grains during 
the time of storage. This might also help the farmers realize the importance of proper storage techniques 
and promote adoption of successful storage techniques such as hermetic storage.  
 Alternatively, grains could also be tested just once before the time of sales. However, this type of 
certification determines the aflatoxin-contamination only at the farmer-level and help farmers achieve a 
higher price but does not guarantee the aflatoxin levels in the end product consumed by the retail consumers.  
This might the case due to the mixing of grains with different aflatoxin levels during the process of milling. 
Our study focuses on certification at the farmers’ level. Huge brands that process and package the grains 
should test the processed grain such as flour to estimate the aflatoxin levels to achieve better prices and 
food safety.  
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 In our study, the choice experiment also estimates the willingness to pay among traders for 
processed-based certification i.e. storage of grains in hermetic bags. Process certification could be 
established to certify that the grains are appropriately stored in hermetic devices.  In this certification, the 
first stage will be like the aflatoxin-level certification where individual and group farmers apply for 
certification before storage. The crops would be tested for various quality parameters such as number of 
broken grains and moisture content. Farmers would be given training on appropriate usage of hermetic 
storage technologies to ensure proper usage.  The next step would include frequent visits from the 
certification agency to the grain storage locations to confirm proper usage of hermetic storage devices 
throughout the storage period. The grains would be then tested for aflatoxin contamination, moisture levels 
and broken grains during the time of sales and will be certified for proper hermetic storage and the aflatoxin 
levels. Traders could use this certification as a proxy for the quality of grains instead of current quality 
measures such as moisture content or number of broken grains. Since aflatoxins would be tested only once, 
the cost of certification for the usage of hermetic bags would be much cheaper for farmers. 
Current Certification 
Out of the many existing private and government certification agencies, we chose a certification 
agency that had the most recent and revised rates for their services. Indocert is a nationally and 
internationally operating certification body accredited by National Accreditation Body (NAB), Government 
of India, as per NPOP for crop production, processing, trade and wild collection. We attempt to identify the 
possible benefits of farmers from receiving certification labels for the grains with the demand data from my 
choice experiment. We use the certification costs provided by Indocert to get our costs of certification. 
Table 16 represents the cost of each activity to get NPOP certification for a year. The table below represents 





Table 19: Annual Certification costs - NPOP  




Preparation Rupees per day 4400 
Travel Time Rupees per day 4400 
Inspection + Report timing Rupees per day 4400 




Fee for scope certificate Rupees per day 1000 
Fees per transaction certificate Rupees per day 250 
Fee for COI (if required) Rupees per day 1500+Tax 
















With government service taxes, travel expenses and chemical analysis, we estimate the cost for 
certification to be around INR 30000. From the traders’ survey, the average prices paid by the traders to 
the farmers are Rs. 12 and Rs. 13 for rice and wheat respectively. For maize, the average price is Rs. 12. 
(www.indexmandi.com). The following table represents the yield in kilograms per hectare.  
Table 20: Yield kg/hectare (2017-2018) 
District Rice (Yield kg/ha) Wheat (Yield kg/ha) Maize (Yield kg/ha) 
Banka 3005 3618 2855 
Samastipur 2086 3616 6648 
Bhagalpur 3442 3294 4613 
Begusarai 1327 2810 411 




We take the average yield of the four districts in Bihar, namely Banka, Begusarai, Bhagalpur and 
Samastipur from where our traders’ survey was carried out. In the table provided below, we calculate the 
total revenue the farmers receive before and after certification. The hypothetical price premium is based on 
the demand calculation from the choice experiments. Since, the average land holding of the farmers in our 
sample area is 0.7 hectares, we calculate the yield for 0.7 hectares, which totals to 1725, 2334 and 2542 kgs 
per year respectively for rice, wheat and maize. 
Table 21: Total Revenue with and without certification (INR per 0.7 hectare) 
  Grains Rice Wheat Maize 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
A Average Yield 
(Kg/0.7 Hectare) 
1,725  1,725  1,725  2,334  2,334  2,334  2,542  2,542  2,542  
B Farmer’s Current 
Price (INR) 




20 22 19 21 22 20 26 28 24 
A*B Total revenue 
without certification 
(INR) 
20,706 20,706 20,706 30,348  30,348  30,348  30,508  30,508  30,508  
A*C Total revenue with 
certification (INR) 
34,510 37,961 32,784  49,024  51,359 46,690 66,102  71,187  61,017  
 
This table provides estimates of the total revenue farmers could earn in multiple scenarios, i.e. with 
NPOP certification and without the certification. We have presented multiple cases; the actual willingness 
to pay, the upper limit and the lower limit. The hypothetical prices are from the choice experiment, for the 






Table 22: Calculation of costs (Hermetic bags + Certification) 
 Grain Rice  Wheat  Maize  
a Yield (Kg/ 0.7 hectare) 1725.5 2334.5 2542.4 
b Annual household consumption(kg/year) 480 312 50 
a-b No. of kgs for storage/sale (per year) 1245.5 2022.5 2492.4 
c No. of kgs for storage/sale (per season)2 622.75 1011.25 1246.2 
c/50 No. of bags required (per season) 13 20 25 
d Marginal Cost of hermetic bags 70 70 70 
e Cost of bags (one season)  910 1400 1750 
f Aflatoxin testing per sample3 700 700 700 
g NPOP Certification costs 30000 30000 30000 
h Total annual production cost per 0.7 ha 30455 30700 30875 
 
In Table 22, we include the net cost of procuring hermetically sealed bags (Hermetic bags – Jute 
bags), since that is an additional cost to farmers producing aflatoxin-free grains. The storage capacity is 50 
kgs per bag. Average household size in Bihar according to the 2011 census was 5.5. 
(www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census). Monthly per capital consumption of rice and wheat in the rural 
areas during the year 2009-2010 in India were 6.8 and 4.3 kgs (NSSO, 2013). Therefore, monthly rice 
consumption for a household is approximately around 40kgs, and wheat consumption for a household is 
26kgs. Annual consumptions are 480kgs of rice and 312kgs of wheat. Maize is generally not stored for self-
consumption; however, we assume farmers store around 2 percent of the yield i.e. 50kgs of maize annually. 
                                                          
2 Hermetic bags can be reused up to four seasons. Hence the cost of bags is calculated only for one season. 
3 Aflatoxin testing is done at USD $10 at ICRISAT per sample  
52 
 
Each bag can be used for four seasons, the cost of such hermetic airtight bags is approximately INR 80 
(USD 1.16) per bag; the marginal cost of hermetic bags is INR 70, since traditional jute bags cost INR 10.  
Table 23: Net Revenue with certification (INR per 0.7 hectare) 
Grain Rice  Wheat  Maize  
Profit with Actual WTP (Case 1) 4055 18324.5 35227.4 
Profit with Upper limit (Case 2) 7506 20659 40312.2 
Profit with Lower limit (Case 3) 2329.5 15990 30142.6 
 
Table 23 suggests that the unexploited price premium ranges approximately from a minimum of 
Rs. 2330 to Rs. 40300 per year for an average farmer in the food supply chain. This is assuming that the 
farmers capture the entire quality premium. Even if the farmers could capture 50 percent of the premium, 
it appears like they could benefit from the certification and hermetic bags. If the traders realize the potential 
benefits from certification and good quality grains, they might be willing to pay a premium to the farmers, 
thus encouraging proper food safety measures throughout the supply chain. 
Limitations 
The levels of aflatoxin contamination can be different at the retail stores due to the blending of 
grains from different farmers at the mill. This could mean that flour from grains could have lesser 
contamination. Since there is no pre-existing certification system for aflatoxin-free grains, we use organic 
certification as a proxy for cost estimation. However, for the aflatoxin certification, the initial set-up might 
be more expensive since sampling of grains might have to take place in different locations at different levels 
in the supply chain.  
It is possible the traders are not aware of the consumer demand for aflatoxin grains.  Since we 
conducted both experiments simultaneously to capture the existing set of information at the various levels 
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along the supply chain, we did not inform traders of the consumer demand. We expect that the demand 
from traders might increase if they were aware of consumer demand for aflatoxin-free grains. A second 
caveat is that the current study measures demand for aflatoxin-free grains and hermetic bags for all the 
grains among traders. The demand for aflatoxin might be grain-specific, due to their different propensity 
for contamination and different end uses. From our discussions with traders in Hyderabad, we know that 
they focus on reducing aflatoxin contamination in grains since they sell their grains for poultry feed which 
pays a premium. Thus, the traders might be interested in aflatoxin-free grains for maize crop specifically.  
The certification costs included in the study are based on current organic certifications. Though 
organic certifications are costly and can be a good proxy, initial certification set-up might be expensive. 
The certification body should maintain all the accurate information describing the certification processes 
for granting the certification as well as maintaining or extending/renewing it. Due to the absence of an 
existing aflatoxin-testing certification body, we expect to see higher initial costs for the farmers since the 
company would face large upfront costs including registering with the government. Thus, the current values 
estimated as the certification cost for farmers in the study might be an under-estimate, at least for the first 
few years of the certification establishment. The highest potential benefit would be for farmers (and/or 
certifiers) to work with large buyers who are willing to pay a premium for aflatoxin-free grains, such as the 









Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
Achieving food safety is crucial to the effort to achieve global food security. This thesis employed 
the choice experiment method to investigate preferences for food safety and quality attributes amongst 
consumers and traders/millers to help inform better food safety policies and producers of good quality 
grains about potential premium that can be captured. Data were collected in face to face interviews with a 
sample of consumers at Gujarat and Bihar in India. The food quality of focus was aflatoxin contamination, 
since this trait in grains is unobservable and highly toxic. Rice, wheat and maize are consumed in large 
quantities; hence quality and safety concerns are paramount. Since certification could act as a proxy for a 
credence good, we added government and private certification types to elicit preferences among them. 
Mixed logit models with interactions model were estimated for both the stated and revealed preference 
experiment to estimate the consumer’s preferences of food safety attributes. The same model was used for 
estimating the demand for traders in Bihar. Findings from the stated choice experiment disclose that the 
end consumers are willing to pay more for good quality food grains, and that they have a slight preference 
towards private certification. In the revealed choice experiment, consumers are willing to pay slightly lesser 
for aflatoxin-free grains than the hypothetical choice experiment and have no preference in the type of 
certification. However, we found that traders from our sample are not willing to pay any premium for grains 
without aflatoxin contamination and do not prefer paying extra for grains stored in hermetically sealed bags. 
This might be because they do not believe in the process that hermetic storage leads to better quality grains 
which in turn yields better prices. Consequently, the farmers may not be able to capture the price premium 
that the end consumers are willing to pay, since the intermediaries create a gap in the supply chain.  
Rampant counterfeiting activities in food safety has placed distrust amongst consumers in India. 
For example, the problem of adulteration of powder and saturated fatty oil in milk (John, 2016), problem 
of antibiotic in honey (Narain, 2010). The Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ), recalled an 
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Indian food company Haldiram’s food product such as Tasty nuts, due to the heavy aflatoxin contamination. 
(Chandra, 2014; FSANZ, 2013). The infamous Maggi noodles by Nestle was found to have high quantities 
of monosodium glutamate and lead well above the prescribed limits in 2015 (Pai, 2018). The slight 
preference in private certification from the hypothetical experiment can possibly be attributed to the pitfalls 
in existing certification conditions in India. Private certification agencies could make use of this opportunity 
in developing countries to expand their firms.  
High seller market power and poor information of food quality standards may prevent the market 
from reaching the societal optimum. In Bihar, farmers have very little market power. In many cases, the 
farmers cannot sell their produce to another trader. Traders with high market power may be able to capture 
some of the quality premium reducing the incentive for households to produce better quality food grains. 
Skidmore et al. (2017) reported that high village market power decreases both the price as well as the 
premium paid by the traders to households producing grains. Price of grain rises at each stage of the supply 
chain and the producers receive the lowest price (Skidmore et al., 2017). Traders who bought grain from 
other traders, on a level higher on the supply chain, paid a higher price. The reason for traders’ reluctance 
in paying more for hermetic bag storage could be that the traders may prefer to improve quality of grains 
manually by removing observable impurities and damaged grains or store the grains in hermetic bags 
themselves. As a result, farmers may not be able to receive a premium for adopting hermetically sealed 
bags for storage and hence no premium for good quality grains.  
However, this could change if the traders are aware of the consumer demand and the possible price 
premiums. It might be possible that the traders are not willing to pay for the process but are willing to pay 
for the product if farmers received certification from an agency. If this is true, then the reason for market 
failure would be imperfect information at the consumer level only.  From the cost-benefit section, we note 
that the certification labeling process might be profitable for both the farmers and the traders. Although 
there is a demand for safe food among consumers, it could take an extended time to develop the certification 
brand, which in turn might affect the incentive to invest in food safety for farmers. Jie Bai (2016) reported 
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that information frictions led to significant under-provision of quality in the local watermelon markets in 
China. The study found that incentives received for better quality watermelons were not enough to invest 
in the branding technology. Thus, a potential extension to the current study is to setup a certification 
structure for aflatoxin contamination testing to inform the price premium that traders and farmers might 
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Gender Interaction Model for Consumer Stated Choice Experiment 
 
 
Table 24: Mixed logit model – Gender Interaction Model (Stated Preference Consumers) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Rice Wheat Maize 
Mean    
Alternate Specific 
Constant 
-0.396* -0.524** -0.494* 
 (0.186) (0.200) (0.198) 
    
Cost -0.316*** -0.391*** -0.336*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0304) (0.0285) 
    
Male_certification -1.922*** -2.639*** -2.244*** 
 (0.398) (0.530) (0.491) 
    
Male_aflatoxin_0-
20ppb 
-0.337 -0.366 3.200*** 
 (0.402) (0.401) (0.541) 
    
Male_aflatoxin_20-
50ppb 
-3.982*** -6.801*** -6.329*** 
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Table 24 (cont.): Mixed logit model – Gender Interaction Model (Stated Preference Consumers) 
 (0.560) (1.140) (1.292) 
    
Private_certification 1.597*** 1.754*** 1.505*** 
 (0.274) (0.344) (0.290) 
    
Aflatoxin 0-20ppb 2.752*** 3.304*** 3.053*** 
 (0.341) (0.371) (0.392) 
    
Aflatoxin 20-50ppb 1.826*** 2.131*** 1.485*** 
 (0.316) (0.392) (0.367) 
SD    
Private_certification 1.081*** 1.822*** 1.256*** 
 (0.240) (0.312) (0.259) 
    
Aflatoxin 0-20ppb 1.331*** 1.181*** 1.523*** 
 (0.246) (0.256) (0.297) 
    
 1.206*** 2.019*** 1.767*** 
Aflatoxin 0-20ppb (0.298) (0.418) (0.392) 
N 2448 2424 2400 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
